Predicting A Mideast nuclear war?*

 Nov. 23, 2007 at 11:00 AM

By MARTIN WALKER
UPI Editor Emeritus

WASHINGTON, Nov. 23 (UPI) -- Anthony Cordesman may be the most
influential man in Washington that most people have never heard of. A
former director of intelligence assessment for the secretary of defense
and director of policy and planning in the Department of Energy, he is
now the top strategic guru at the Center for Strategic & International
Studies.

Most serious politicians and journalists have for some years based their
analyses of the Iraq war and its aftermath on his universally respected
research. Cordesman is a facts man who likes and reveres good data and
cool, clinical analysis as the keystones of policymaking.

He has now turned his laser-like research and forensic intelligence
skills to studying the real implication of the endless diplomatic minuet
at the United Nations over Iran's nuclear ambitions. In the real world,
this matters mainly because an Iranian nuclear capability would
transform the power balance in the wider Middle East, and leave the
region and the rest of us living under the constant prospect of a
nuclear exchange between Iran and Israel.

This would mean, Cordesman suggests, some 16 million to 28 million
Iranians dead within 21 days, and between 200,000 and 800,000 Israelis
dead within the same time frame. The total of deaths beyond 21 days
could rise very much higher, depending on civil defense and public
health facilities, where Israel has a major advantage.

It is theoretically possible that the Israeli state, economy and
organized society might just survive such an almost-mortal blow. Iran
would not survive as an organized society. "Iranian recovery is not
possible in the normal sense of the term," Cordesman notes.

The difference in the death tolls is largely because Israel is believed
to have more nuclear weapons of very much higher yield (some of 1
megaton), and Israel is deploying the Arrow advanced anti-missile system
in addition to its Patriot batteries. Fewer Iranian weapons would get
through.

The difference in yield matters. The biggest bomb that Iran is expected
to have is 100 kilotons, which can inflict third-degree burns on exposed
flesh at 8 miles; Israel's 1-megaton bombs can inflict third-degree
burns at 24 miles. Moreover, the radiation fallout from an airburst of
such a 1-megaton bomb can kill unsheltered people at up to 80 miles
within 18 hours as the radiation plume drifts. (Jordan, by the way,
would suffer severe radiation damage from an Iranian strike on Tel Aviv.)

Cordesman assumes that Iran, with less than 30 nuclear warheads in the
period after 2010, would aim for the main population centers of Tel Aviv
and Haifa, while Israel would have more than 200 warheads and far better
delivery systems, including cruise missiles launched from its 3
Dolphin-class submarines.

The assumption is that Israel would be going for Iran's nuclear
development centers in Tehran, Natanz, Ardekan, Saghand, Gashin,
Bushehr, Aral, Isfahan and Lashkar A'bad. Israel would also likely
target the main population centers of Tehran, Tabriz, Qazvin, Isfahan,
Shiraz, Yazd, Kerman, Qom, Ahwaz and Kermanshah. Cordesman points out
that the city of Tehran, with a population of 15 million in its
metropolitan area, is "a topographic basin with mountain reflector.
Nearly ideal nuclear killing ground."

But it does not end there. Cordesman points out that Israel would need
to keep a "reserve strike capability to ensure no other power can
capitalize on Iranian strike." This means Israel would have to target
"key Arab neighbors" -- in particular Syria and Egypt.

Cordesman notes that Israel would have various options, including a
limited nuclear strike on the region mainly inhabited by the Alawite
minority from which come the ruling Assad dynasty. A full-scale Israeli
attack on Syria would kill up to 18 million people within 21 days;
Syrian recovery would not be possible. A Syrian attack with all its
reputed chemical and biological warfare assets could kill up to 800,000
Israelis, but Israeli society would recover.

An Israeli attack on Egypt would likely strike at the main population
centers of Cairo, Alexandria, Damietta, Port Said, Suez, Luxor and
Aswan. Cordesman does not give a death toll here, but it would certainly
be in the tens of millions. It would also destroy the Suez Canal and
almost certainly destroy the Aswan dam, sending monstrous floods down
the Nile to sweep away the glowing rubble. It would mean the end of
Egypt as a functioning society.

Cordesman also lists the oil wells, refineries and ports along the Gulf
that could also be targets in the event of a mass nuclear response by an
Israel convinced that it was being dealt a potentially mortal blow.
Being contained within the region, such a nuclear exchange might not be
Armageddon for the human race; it would certainly be Armageddon for the
global economy.

So in clear, concise and chillingly forensic style, Cordesman spells out
that the real stakes in the crisis that is building over Iran's nuclear
ambitions would certainly include the end of Persian civilization, quite
probably the end of Egyptian civilization, and the end of the Oil Age.
This would also mean the end of globalization and the extraordinary
accretions in world trade and growth and prosperity that are hauling
hundreds of millions of Chinese and Indians and others out of poverty.