Biopiracy, Genetically Modified Seeds and Rural India "Over 100,000 India farmers have committed suicide..."

[Pastor Dale Morgan]

*Perilous Times

Biopiracy, Genetically Modified Seeds and Rural India "Over 100,000
India farmers have committed suicide..."*

by Priya Kumar

.
Global Research, June 2, 2009

Introduction

The reality for the average Indian remains the same: agricultural
cultivation and the ability to farm is the bedrock of rural living. With
its historical practices, values, and communal sentiments of respect,
cultivation and the practice of farming has embedded roots. Farming for
Indians is not only a source of income – it is a source of culture and
identity. Since the late 1990s however, Indian governmental officials
have wilfully compromised this sentiment for the ‘bright lights’
associated with the West.

After over a decade of trade liberalization and free market reforms,
mainstream economic development has left rural India to fend for itself.
Amidst great levels of industrialization and growth, the vast majority
of Indians have been left behind. Agriculture is the primary source of
livelihood for some 70% of Indians[1].Considering the fact that only 1%
of Americans and 2-3% of Europeans derive their livelihood from
agriculture, this is a huge level of dependence[2].

India’s desire to become a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO),
and the adoption of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
(TRIPs) specifically has compromised the livelihood of farmers. With the
adoption of such neo-liberal policies, the sovereignty of rural India
has been threatened. TRIPs in particular has created a gateway for
agro-business conglomerates to engage in biopiracy and GM seed
monopolization, effectively marginalizing rural communities. Through the
manipulation of intellectual property rights (IPRs), conglomerates such
as Monsanto have put rural farmers on the defensive. This paper
highlights the manipulative nature and destabilizing affects of patents,
IPRs and agro-business conglomerates in the context of rural India.
Special focus is placed upon the infamous Basmati rice case, and Bt
cotton, the first GM seed made available to Indian farmers.

Through these case studies, this paper will illustrate both the intent
and impact of agro-business conglomerates and the associated costs
incurred by farmers. Centuries of indigenous knowledge, tradition
cultivation practises and sharing techniques are being compromised. Many
farmers have lost their right to cultivate and control the agricultural
production cycle. As a result, farmers increasingly find themselves
indebt, disempowered and most alarming, suicidal. With approximately one
in every four farmers globally being Indian, the rural lifestyle – the
cultural origins of India are being threatened[3]. Agro-business
conglomerates are promoting a cycle of dependence, which, if not stopped
will carry with it disastrous affects for the entire country.

Key Events and Considerations in History

From its colonial roots to present day, India’s history is chequered
with multiple patent law structures and IPR debates. Dating back to
1852, under British rule, India adopted (unwillingly so), a specific
patent-like structure within its legislative structure[4]. For rural
India, these imposed patent laws represented the limits of their control
over their resources. Overall, this marginalization became one of the
sources for mobilization movements for independence and autonomy. In
terms of IPR law, the 1911 Patent Act is regarded by many a crucial
document which spearheaded the desire for emancipation and independence
from the British[5].

From the time of independence in 1947, up until the 1960s, agricultural
development was not a major focus for public debate. Rather, the
population was still coming to terms with what it meant to be a
sovereign state in the context of global affairs. It was only with the
threat of famine in 1961 and severe droughts in 1965 and 1966 that
officials recognized the agricultural hardships that plagued rural
populations[6].These hardships provided a justification for both the
World Bank and the US to enter India with the promise of “miracle
seeds”, assistance and price incentives[7]. These “miracle seeds” were
actually hybrid seeds, and resulted in huge yields of food grains.
Indeed, the Green Revolution had entered India, and with it came an
entirely new concept: non-organic farming.

During the late 1960s, debates focused on finding an appropriate balance
between public interest, rural agriculture and India’s desire to develop
and industrialize at a steady pace. The 1970 India Patent Act
internalized these debates. Critical questions emerged with regards to
India’s interest in limiting patent monopoly, promoting societal
creativity, and stable rural agricultural production[8].

The Patent Act was hailed as a fair balance between investor and
consumer interests, as it promoted industrial growth in an unrestrictive
manner[9].Plants and animals were restricted, so that they could not be
patented, moreover food products, chemical inventions and drugs were
eligible for only process patents[10].Patents were deemed to be valid
for 7 years after their date of application[11].In terms of agricultural
IPR legislation, and to the benefit of majority of Indians the 1970
Patent Act is regarded to be extremely restrictive[12]. However, this
all changed as India entered a new phase of economic liberalization, in
the hopes of being embraced as a viable international trading partner.

In response to the balance of payment crisis, the New Economic Policy of
1991 (NEP 1991) introduced major changes in India[13].With an emphasis
on liberalization, privatization, and the overall globalization of
national economic structures NEP 1991 meant a fundamental change for
agriculture[14].Reform policies were fixated upon enterprise expansion,
and as a result,agricultural communities since then have continued to
suffer. To this day, agricultural development policy, necessary for
sustainable industrialization within rural Indian communities, remains
absent. With an increased desire to ‘catch-up’ to international economic
powerhouses, deep-rooted industries such as the agricultural sector have
taken for granted since 1991. The complete abandonment of rural India
has been facilitated by the openness associated with NEP 1991. This
process has been exacerbated through India’s hoop jumping into the WTO.

Transformation through TRIPs

The transition to the WTO from the GATT marks a crucial time when the
rights and sovereignty of rural communities in developing countries was
institutionally compromised. This has been accepted by officials as a
consequence of increased international economic engagement. In
comparison to the WTO, the GATT provided countries with far more freedom
to develop and follow their own IPR laws. The GATT was not specific with
regards to patent law. A key distinguishing factor of the WTO is the
TRIPs agreement. In order for countries to be accepted as members of the
WTO, they must adhere to all of its laws, including those of TRIPs.
Thus, in order to be given clearance to join the WTO, countries had to
amend any national patent law that contradicts TRIPs[15].

India signed into the WTO in 1995 and has since taken many steps forward
to be fully embraced by the international community as an excellent
trading partner[16]. Since 1 January 1995 for example, India’s Patent
Office has been accepting all applications for agro-chemical invention
product patents[17].However, this process of patent reformation was not
a smooth process. A constant criticism of developing countries has been
that they have taken far too long to adopt TRIPs. India’s sluggish TRIPs
adoption process was criticized by the U.S, who took action by notifying
the WTO. In 1998 the WTO publicly ruled that India’s failure to fully
amend its patent law was in violation of TRIPs, and was overall illegal[18].

In response to such criticisms, the Indian government has undergone
multiple IPR legislative changes, the first of which being the 1999
Patent(Amendment)Act[19].This was a serious legislative amendment, as
exclusionary clauses of product patents in areas of food, drugs and
medicine were removed[20].Moreover, in order to be fully recognized by
the WTO, Indian officials altered IPR legislation to allow for the
patenting of life forms, living organism derivatives, gene patents and
components[21]. National IPR law had to also be changed to allow for
patents to be valid for 20 years[22]. Reforms took place again in 2002
and by 2005; India was officially following conditions of TRIPs.

The balanced approach of the 1970 Patent Act has been forever lost.
India’s desire to become a member of the WTO has come at a very high
price: its legislative sovereignty. However, this loss of autonomy has
meant a gain for some, namely the U.S. TRIPs has essentially globalized
the American understanding of IPR law[23]. The institutional weakness of
countries such as India, along with the desire to engage in global trade
has capped sovereign thought. TRIPs has put a limit on the capacity to
effectively ensure biodiversity, and provide both basic medicine and
food to populations[24].

In the context of agricultural cultivation techniques, TRIPs has
institutionalized a predictable scheme of ‘winners and losers’.
Specifically, powerful countries such as the U.S have the knowledge and
resources to use TRIPs and IPR law to their advantage. Moreover, such
advantages have allowed for western based agro-business conglomerates
such as Monsanto to benefit as well. To the dismay of rural farmers,
Indian governmental infrastructure cannot effectively compete with the
west. Moreover, in some cases government officials have often taken a
stance of ‘benign neglect’ due to the severity of negative externalities
emerging from IPR conflicts. The innovations and seed developments of
rural India were once priceless – this is no longer the case.

Case Studies – Basmati Rice & Bt Cotton

The following case studies were selected on the premise that they best
highlight the self-serving and manipulative nature of agro-business
conglomerates. TRIPs has provided the legal apparatus necessary to
‘legitimately’ engage in biopiracy and seed monopolization. In the
context of IPR, India’s only other option would be to formally leave the
WTO, which for its industrialists and the most powerful is not an
option. The actions and techniques of agro-business conglomerates have
not gone unnoticed. As, in the words of Vandana Shiva, both
conglomerates and TRIPs are “not just for new inventions but for the
knowledge of our grandmothers”[25].

The Case of Basmati Rice

Basmati rice, known for its aroma and long grains has its origins in the
Indian subcontinent[26].Across the world, these special rice grains are
a staple of South Asian cuisine and history. Basmati meaning “queen of
fragrance” and “fragrant Earth” is embedded in Indian folklore and
religious practices, in which they often symbolizing
growth[27].According to Haryana Agricultural University, one of the
earliest references to the rice was made in poet Varis Shah’s 1776 Heer
Ranjha[28].There are approximately 27 distinct documented varieties of
Basmati rice[29]. These varieties cover 10-15% of the total rice
cultivation area within the county[30]. Geographically speaking, the
cultivation of Basmati is partial to the lands of Punjab, Haryana and
Uttar Pradesh[31].Collectively, Indian grows approximately 650,000
tonnes annually,400,000-500,000 tonnes of which are exported[32].With an
embedded history and economic ties to specific regions, it is
interesting how an agro-business conglomerate could ever mistakenly
question the origins of Basmati.

Biopiracy “refers to the use of intellectual property systems to
legitimize the exclusive ownership and control over biological resources
and biological products and processes that have been used over centuries
in non-industrialized culture”[33].

On 2 September 1997, Texas based RiceTec Inc. was granted patent number
5663484, for the genetic lines of Basmati rice, by the U.S Patent and
Trademark Office(USPTO)[34].Immediately, RiceTec began to develop
hybrids using various blends of Basmati. Promoted as an, ‘American type
of Basmati rice’, RiceTec developed a new plant variety cross between
American long-grain and Basmati[35].

Criticism from Indian rice farmers logically ensued, as many were forced
to pay royalties to the conglomerate[36].The production and cultivation
of Basmati has with it a history dating back to centuries ago. For
farmers, the grain is an entity that is constantly evolving. In the
context of India, Basmati rice has always been considered a common
resource dependant upon word of mouth knowledge and transfer. Using this
logic, RiceTec alleged that the ‘Basmati’ name was in public domain, and
that by patenting it; they were in actuality protecting its name and
origins[37]. RiceTec soon came out with hybrid versions: Kasmati,
Texmati, Jasmati, which for rural farmers clearly illustrated the profit
based interest of the conglomerate[38]. Through its acquisition, RiceTec
patented some 22 varieties of the rice[39].One of which being Basmati
867, a rice grain which was very similar to original Basmati but was
advertised to have a less chalky more refined taste[40].With the
livelihood of approximately 250,000 farmers in jeopardy, the Indian
government finally reacted[41].

In April of 2000 Indian officials publicly pleaded with USPTO to review
the RiceTec Basmati case, as Indian exports were beginning to be
threatened[42].Government officials were armed with hundreds of pages of
scientific data proving that the distinguishing characteristics of
RiceTec’s rice were also found in Basmati[43]. Moreover, the use of the
name ‘Basmati’ itself was misleading for customers considering that the
product was a hybrid grain[44].The name ‘Basmati’ carries with it a
reputation of culinary excellence, and RiceTec was benefiting from it.
Under Article 23 of the TRIPs agreement,using words such as “kind”,
“type”, and “style” is illegal, and RiceTec had used such words numerous
times in advertising schemes[45].

Moreover, considering the geographical indicators clause of TRIPs, the
entire process of approval and acquisition of RiceTec’s Basmati patent
can be deemed to be illegal. Article 22 of the TRIPs agreement, (the
geographical indicator clause) prohibits the use of both direct and
indirect uses of a goods geographical origin[46].In this respect,
Basmati is to the India what Champagne is to France, part of the
regional identity.

On 14 August 2001 USPTO overturned a large amount of claims held under
Patent No.5663484[47]. Amidst great public scrutiny and criticism,
RiceTec lost the right to use the ‘Basmati like’ advertising slogan. At
the discretion of USPTO, out of 20 Basmati patent claims, 15 were
withdrawn[48].RiceTec was able to keep their Indian-American hybrids
Texmati, Jasmati and Kasmati[49].To the dismay and outrage of citizens
and farmers, after the patent withdrawals, the Indian government
publicly stated they were very satisfied and wished to drop all other
charges.

Overall, the most appalling aspect of this infamous case is not the
manipulative nature of RiceTec. Rather it is the lack of immediate
government response. As previously stated, officials only became
concerned after Basmati exports were felt to be in jeopardy. The
overstretching nature of patent No.5663484 was not really a concern for
Indian officials. It was only when citizen groups filed a Public
Interest Litigation (PIL) claim to the Supreme Court, that the
Government of India were compelled to act against RiceTec[50].Moreover,
the claims made to USPTO against RiceTec, concentrated on the actual
Basmati grain (exports) and neglected areas of seed and plant
biopiracy[51].Unfortunately, the concerns and losses incurred by rural
farmers were not a concern for officials. The 15 withdrawn patent claims
granted by USPTO are the result of many letters contesting the patent,
citizen protests and large-scale rural movements[52].

Understanding Basmati Biopiracy

Vandana Shiva makes it clear, that yes “[w]e have won the Basmati
biopiracy battle, though the war for defence of farmers' rights,
indigenous knowledge and biodiversity still needs to be won”[53].
Although the battle for Basmati rice is in relative terms, over, there
remains a great amount of uncertainty as to how such a blatant act of
piracy could occur with minimal opposition from officials. Beyond
biopiracy,RiceTec’s Basmati patent is a case of resource piracy as a
natural resource (Basmati rice) was taken from a specific country
without any sort of granted permission or public recognition[54]. It is
a case of economic piracy as RiceTec used the term ‘Basmati’, to
advertise their hybrid rice, in the hopes of appealing to customers
looking for an aromatic product similar to the original
Basmati[55].Finally, it was a case of both intellectual and cultural
piracy as RiceTec through its acquisition of Basmati, patented a key
heritage piece of rice producing rural communities without permission[56].

Based upon the above legal inconsistencies, it is clear that the TRIPs
agreement promotes a rather unfair, biased one-sided pro West framework.
Developing countries like India have the choice of either conforming,
and as result turning the blind eye on their population, or being
blacklisted from international organizations. In the face of trade,
Indian officials have consistently chosen to deny their population of
basic sovereign rights. The externalities of which threaten the core
characteristics of what it means to be a farmer in a rural Indian
agricultural community.

The severity of RiceTec’s biopiracy cannot be underestimated, as the
conglomerate was claiming to have invented the physical characteristics
of Basmati such as the plant height and grain length[57].By claiming
ownership of the rice plant itself, RiceTec was directly threatening
rural farming communities. Throughout centuries of development, Indian
farmers have produced some 200,000 varieties of rice[58].Therefore, if
RiceTec were to own the Basmati rice plant itself the autonomy and
ability of farmers to engage in common sharing techniques, (a
fundamental of rural communities), would be compromised. To the dismay
of farmers, in the eyes of both IPR law, and the TRIPs agreement, it
would be considered illegal to share cultivation techniques. “Of all the
IPRs contained in the TRIPs agreement, the patents provisions may be the
most significant in terms of economic implications, especially for
developing countries”[59]. For rural farmers, patents stand to
compromise what is known as ‘the commons’.

Agricultural knowledge and cultivation techniques passed down from older
generations carry with them inherent seed adaptations and
innovations[60].Therefore, any sort of seed patenting is limiting
indigenous common knowledge. The ability to work the land and use the
surrounding environment is compromised for monopolistic like
conglomerate seed promotion. Biodiversity is inherently threatened, as
farmers no longer have the rights to freely work their crop. Moreover,
agro-business conglomerates have no real responsibility to ensure that
farmers from developing countries are taken care of[61].Ultimately,
governing bodies are held responsible for their rural populations, and
in the case of India, this is not being done. Indeed, with concerns over
export levels, official did intervene and put an end to RiceTec’s
overarching patent.

Institutional Realities

Marginalization and destabilization of rural Indian farmers has been
institutionalized through the acceptance of TRIPs. Moreover, all
previous “equitable benefit sharing” as envisioned by the UN Convention
for Biological Diversity (CBD) have been permanently
undermined[62].Taking place in 1992, in the Rio de Janeiro the CBD
advocates for conservation, sharing and state sovereignty over
resources[63].Promoted primarily by developing countries like India, the
CBD attempts to integrate and protect indigenous traditional knowledge.
Concretely, the CBD called for the sovereign rights of rural resources[64].

Developing countries take particular issue with the TRIPs agreement’s
lack of prior art protection. Many calls have been made for complete
disclosure in the context of granting patents based on novelty (Article
27.1)[65].Opponents of TRIPs advocate for an amendment, which would
institutionalize a prior art clause forcing patent applicants to divulge
full information and history of their ‘innovation’[66]. The support of
such an amendment has sparked much controversy, and in the name of
traditional knowledge, many developing countries have remained fearless
in their pursuits.

This however has not been the case for governing Indian officials. In
fact, continuous efforts have been made to further integrate with
international economic powerhouses such as the U.S. The U.S is the
number one supporter of TRIPs and does not advocate in any way for the
CBD[67]. Furthermore, due to the fact that the CBD is a framework and
not legally binding per say, TRIPs has continued to remain a priority
for developing countries that wish to gain international economic
acceptance.

In an effort to conform to TRIPs, in 2001 India enacted the Protection
of Plant Varieties and Farmer’s Rights Act (PVP)[68].To allow for plant
breeder’s rights (PBR), a community gene fund was set up however it has
since been cut, only to resurface as a responsibility of the Biological
Diversity Act[69]. The lack of care for rural communities is evident in
the inability of governing officials to fully set up an agricultural
policy to the benefit of farmers. Although PBR promotes seed saving,
exchange and selling, seed varieties must be protected[70].In reality
most rural farmers do not have the resources to legally protest their
varieties. Moreover, such an imposition of a legal structure debilitates
the fundamentals of common knowledge exchange. In fact, PBR, as a legal
apparatus is ensuring the rights of large-scale breeders, not
small-scale farmers.

As illustrated in the above case analysis of Basmati rice, Indian
officials have not been entirely negligent. However, the social
realities spawning from GM seed has been consistently avoided. This is
especially visible when considering the affects of Bt cotton, as
discussed below.

The Case of BT Cotton

Prior to colonization, cotton was traded in the Indus Valley as mainly a
Luxury good[71].It was only in the 19th century, after colonization that
cotton cultivation followed a more mass production like structure[72].
Multiple attempts have been made by various outside actors (namely the
British and agro-business conglomerates) to standardize cultivation
techniques. In the 1970s, through the introduction of hybrid
cottonseeds, the reality for rural farming communities has continuously
been characterized by a struggle for sovereignty and control.

Cotton production is a staple of the Indian agricultural economy. Some 7
million farmers depend on the crop for sustainable living, and overall
21% of all cotton produced globally comes from India[73].However, cotton
is a very expensive crop to cultivate. Over half of India’s total
pesticides (40,000 tonnes) are used in the upkeep of cotton
cropland[74]. The prices of inputs such as pesticides have continued to
increase. Average expenditure for cotton crop pesticides has increased
from Rs. 99 per acre (1972-3) to Rs. 5,934 per acre(1996-7)[75]. For
agro-business conglomerates, the related expenses of cotton production
are the ideal platform to sell, innovate, and develop their seed monopolies.

Conglomerates have taken advantage of the hardships associated with
cotton production, and in the context of India, uneducated desperate
rural communities who are merely looking to improve their standards of
living are at their mercy. Rural India has been duped. Specifically, the
introduction of Bt cotton has compromised the sense of sovereignty felt
by farmers and completely destabilized rural communities. It is
estimated that in only one growing season, Bt cotton with its massive
failures costs farmers a total of Rs. 1.3 billion, over 105,000
acres[76]. The self-serving nature of conglomerates is fully visible
when considering the exploitive and destabilizing effects Bt cotton has
had on rural India.

Monsanto developed Bt cotton in 1995; the plant was genetically
engineered to include insecticide to fight the common bollworm[77]. The
seed includes toxins, which Monsanto alleges will reduce costs for
farmers. In 1998 Monsanto began a series of Bt cotton trial tests in
India, albeit illegally[78].Monsanto did not apply for trial testing
clearance, and was not given any sort of formal approval to conduct
studies on rural land. Thus from its origins, in the eyes of scorned
farmers, Monsanto’s “concern” for rural communities is an outright facade.

After going public with the results of their trial tests, Monsanto
promoted Bt cotton as the perfect cost-cutting crop for rural India. It
was claimed that yield output would increase to 3,300 pounds per
acre[79].Moreover, Bt cotton would need to be sprayed approximately 2.6
times less then both organic and hybrid cotton[80].Even though inputs
were more expensive, the genetically engineered seed would be sprayed
sparingly, ultimately reducing the cost of cultivation by 30% to 40% at
least[81]. With promises of higher yields and lower costs, the Indian
government officially approved three Bt cotton hybrids (MECH 12, MECH
162, MECH 184)for clearance in 2002[82].

This clearance was given to Monsanto in conjunction with the Maharashtra
Hybrid Seed Company (Mahyco), which conveniently enough, Monsanto has a
26% stake in[83].Bt cotton was the first GM seed to be given clearance
by the Indian government and is now viewed as the example of how
agro-business conglomerates impact vulnerable rural communities. As
highlighted below, pockets of rural Indian communities have been
completely marginalized to the point of despair due to crop failure,
resulting in unfathomable consequences.

The “success” of Bt cotton is a fabrication by Monsanto-Mahyco. It is
unrealistic to assume that such conglomerates would publish data that
contradicted their associated financial interests of seed
monopolization. A 2004 Monsanto study predictably claimed Bt cotton to
considerably improve cotton farmer crop yields returns. The countrywide
study claimed that yields increased by 58% resulting in an increase in
farmer incomes by 60%[84]. Just two years prior, (23 October to 2
November 2002), the Research Foundation for Science, Technology and
Ecology (RFSTE) undertook a survey study in the attempts to highlight
the real affects of Bt cotton on yields. Firstly, it was discovered that
in reality bollworm pests attacked Bt crop far more often than compared
to simple hybrid and organic cotton crops[85].Secondly, the claim of
3,300 pounds of yield per acre was never realized,with the highest yield
being 880 pounds per acre[86]. Finally, the RFSTE survey concluded that
organic and hybrid cotton producing rural communities produced an
average yield of 1,000 pounds per acre[87].

The Cycle of Destabilization

Once Bt cotton is planted, the cycle of systematic destabilization
begins, and not much can be done at that point to mitigate the losses
that will soon be incurred by the farmer. Conglomerates are aware of the
domino like effect Bt cotton can have within rural communities. Nearly,
90% of all bollworm larvae leave the fields[88].Cross-pollination is
inevitable, and is a preferred tactic to gain new “customers”. Bt crop
is supposed to be surrounded by a 5 row deep sanitary organic band,
essentially producing a cultivation ratio of 80:20[89].Many farmers are
unaware of this principle, as conglomerates stand to gain new business
from cross-pollination mistakes and do not fully divulge GM cultivation
techniques. In 2004, Bt cotton crop occupied 1.3 million acres of Indian
land, approximately 7% of the total land allocated to cotton
production[90].By 2006, Bt cotton cropland had increased to almost 3.8
hectares[91].

Even though it is a serious problem for farmers, not all increases can
be attributed to cross-pollination. In promoting Bt, the rhetoric used
by Monsanto is extremely enticing. Advertising campaigns often use
notable public figures that appeal to the public, especially rural
farmers. The promise of less input costs has been the primary means
through which Bt cotton has gained government support and approval. As a
result, the utter failure of the crop is a major surprise for governing
bodies, which, at the present time do not know how to react.

Resistance & Crop Failure

Monsanto has publicly admitted that resistance levels of the genetic
pesticides in Bt seeds do wear down after the first few harvested
seasons [92].The failure of Bt cotton in this sense is real, and
depending upon the farmer, can lead to multiple negative consequences.
At the most basic level,all farmers incur the financial cost of the
actual seed. This is significant considering that Bt cotton seeds are
approximately four times more expensive then both organic and hybrid
seeds[93]. Also, with the purchase of the Bt seed farmers must give up
the right to harvest their own seed, which they have evolved over the years.

This is why Bt cotton is especially debilitating, by giving up their
indigenous cottonseed; the farmer becomes locked into a cycle of
agro-business conglomerate dependence. Farmers have limited control over
the Bt seed, as the cycle of production becomes more of a scientific
chemical mixing game. Bt cotton cropland is sprayed as many as 30 times
a year due to increased bollworm resistance[94].Such an increased level
of chemical use has killed off many natural ‘enemies’ of bollworm pests
including certain wasp and spider species[95].It took some $500 million
(U.S) to develop specific pesticides that fight the bollworm pest, and
it took only 5 years to develop resistant bollworms[96].

Moreover, such a high level of bollworm resistance has allowed for other
sucking pests, such as spider mites, leaf hoppers and beet worms to
increasingly attack Bt cotton fields[97]. The Bt pesticide does not have
the genetic characteristics to effectively fight off these pests. Thus,
farmers are forced to purchase inputs in the form of pesticides,
herbicides and insecticides on a continuous basis. Bt cotton has
developed a cyclical like purchasing scheme where farmers constantly
have to salvage their crop through inputs. This has put majority of Bt
cotton farmers in debt, as they cannot afford the endless array of
necessary inputs. If they do not upkeep their crop, their livelihood is
threatened, resulting in greater poverty and conglomerate dependence.
With the interest rate of loans between 36% and 50%, farmers in these
communities are increasingly becoming indebted[98]. These loans are not
coming from officials; rather they are from private rural lenders and
agro-business conglomerates.

The above has been disastrous within India’s entire cotton belt, however
due to biophysical realities, it has severely affected the states of
Andhra Pradesh (AP) and Maharashtra. In the case of AP, cropland has not
reacted well to the genetic characteristics of Bt. Non GM seeds need
approximately 3,000 litres of water to produce one kilo of crop,
anything else (including Bt seed) needs at least 5,000 litres of water
to produce one kilo[99]. AP often suffers from drought, and as a result,
Bt cotton crops within the state has caused massive destabilization.

Bt Cotton farmers in AP spray fields more often, have lower yields and
as a result obtain less profit then farmers in other states. All three
approved Bt cotton varieties have not been able to survive and overcome
the extreme nature of AP droughts[100]. In 2003, Mr. V.S Rao,
Agricultural Minister of AP commented that in the case of Bt cotton,
“farmers have not experienced very positive and encouraging
results”[101].Cotton from Bt fields is characteristically very dry and
small, and produces low levels of crop yield, ultimately limiting its
market value[102].

Moreover, AP farmers cannot afford to properly irrigate Bt cotton crops,
further diminishing their returns. With lower associated income returns,
AP cotton farmers are more likely to fall into debt because no matter
what, they must purchase the necessary inputs if they wish to sustain
the Bt cotton crop. Roughly 80% of all loans given to AP farmers come
from non-official sources[103].These third parties, spare nothing, and
benefit from the fragile nature of rural farmers. For many farmers, Bt
cotton is truly a nightmare with no real end in sight. The despair felt
by these farmers has manifested itself in both increased levels of debt
and most alarming, increased levels of suicide.

Farmer suicides in AP have increased after Bt cotton was both approved
and promoted by governing officials. The financial stress associated
with Bt cotton, has indeed been grave. Moreover, with the adoption of
such GM seeds and subsequent failure, many rural farmers have
increasingly felt deep remorse. This sentiment of loss is a result of
much regret associated with leaving cultural farming techniques, which
carried with a sense of community and family[104]. The loss of control
over crop in both the indebted and sovereign sense is simply too much
for many farmers.

A similar trend is visible in Maharastra, which is home to some 3.2
million cotton farmers[105]. Farmers using Bt cottonseeds have
continuously complained of wilting crops[106]. Better known as ‘rot
root’, Bt cotton is not accustom to the biophysical environment of many
regions in India. Moreover, in all cases of Bt failure, farmers have
been unable to compensate for the natural environment in which they are
cultivating the seed. The scientific regulatory environment needed for
successful Bt returns, in reality is not feasible for farmers who are
used to working their land. This frustration has taken its toll on
farmers. The state has confirmed that over 200 farmer suicides occurred
between July 2005 and February 2006 alone[107]. As in the case of AP,
many of these farmers were indebted. Some 60% of the farmers who took
their lives during this time were indebted, between $110 and $550
dollars[108].

Insect-resistant seeds such as Bt cotton are the only transgenic
varieties, which have been widely adopted by small-scale
farmers[109].Moreover, some 75% of cultivatable Indian land exists in
dry areas[110]. There exists a large population of rural farmers who are
experiencing problems with Bt cotton crop, due to their reliance on
natural rainfall. For conglomerates and respective shopkeepers, they are
the perfect demographic. This is exacerbated by the fact that these
farmers have minimal control over their land. Rural farmers have
experienced a “deskilling” of cultivation techniques, which carries with
it severe social and ecological consequences [111].The cultural
importance of knowledge sharing is being lost to scientific IPRs. Due to
the rule-based scientific formula techniques of cultivation associated
with GM seeds like Bt cotton farmers can no longer work their land.
Through massive debts and depression, GM seeds such as Bt cotton have
increased levels of rural bankruptcy and suicide[112].

Movements Against Destabilization

Overall, since 1997 over 100,000 farmers have committed suicide
nationally – 86.5% of which carried an average debt of $835[113]. The
Indian government has continuously attributed these suicides to mental
illnesses and domestic problems, effectively avoiding the
epidemic[114].This level of despair must be addressed, as the
consequences are becoming increasingly burdensome for rural inhabitants.

The majority of rural Indian farmers inherit small and median scale
farms and small and marginal farmers account for over 70% of all Indian
farmers [115].India has a patriarchal system and men are the head of the
household. The majority of individuals who take their lives are male,
who through their actions leave the responsibility of an entire family
to the eldest female. As in the aftermath of the suicide, remaining
family members carry the burden of the unpaid load. If the loan cannot
be paid the farm is shamefully confiscated by third party lenders[116].
Under a great deal of harassment, loans may be paid off, in which case
children characteristically must drop out of school, and work to gain
income [117].The widow’s burden has been the source of much social
upheaval in rural communities.

In response to such devastation, many social movements have emerged in
hopes of mitigating the damaging effects agri-business conglomerates in
conjunction with IPR manipulation have had. Self Reliance Education and
Employment (SEEE), is one of these movements. SEEE, mainly focuses upon
the outward mobility of rural women, who are most severely impacted by
suicide. Some 25,000 women from impoverished rural communities have
received vocational training in hopes of moving beyond the despair
associated with farming[118]. The Navdanya, a seed movement promoted by
Vandana Shiva is another example of rural community mobilization in the
face of farm failures. Navdanya, focuses upon protecting Indian seed
biodiversity, and has over 16 community seed banks in place in over 6
Indian states[119].Patent law is treated as an illegal entity[120].
Again, moving beyond the status quo, a focus is placed upon ensuring
that the rights of farmers are maintained.

With the above crisis in mind, it appears as though the government has
abandoned rural populations. A weak institutional framework has left
minimal outlets of recourse for farmers. The Indian government has
continuously compromised rural populations for the industrial benefits
they have realized through the ‘free markets’ associated with both NEP
1991 and the WTO. Liberalization has forced farmers to “distress sale”
tactics, and most worrisome, has pushed many inhabitants to work outside
rural communities[121]. It is estimated that by 2020, some 70% of Tamil
Nadu, 65% of Punjab, and 55% of Uttar Pradesh migration will come from
rural communities[122]. These, agricultural refugees 400 million strong,
are a reality which governing officials will have to address[123]. The
majority of the industrial growth taking place in India is concentrated
in urban centres. This growth will be seriously undermined if rural
communities continue to be neglected.

Concluding Remarks

The above case studies highlight the manipulative nature of both
agro-business conglomerates and current realities of IPR law. Developing
countries such as India have few options; either comply with
international agreements like TRIPs and engage in forward moving trade
at the cost of rural communities or be blacklisted from the WTO for not
following prerequisites of open borderless free markets needed for
enrolment. Indian officials have chosen the latter, which has altered
seed production from a need driven agricultural cycle to a supply and
profit driven industry. This industrialization of agricultural
production has stripped away the identity associated with indigenous
farming and rural communities – the idea of rural self-sufficiency has
been compromised[124].

This paper has highlighted the real abilities of agro-business
conglomerates such as Monsanto, Mahyco and RiceTec, who are relentless
in their desire to gain control and monopolize rural communities. These
attempts are both explicit, as visible in the case of Basmati rice and
implicit, as visible in the case of Bt cotton. Common themes emerge from
both of the above case studies, which effectively characterize the harsh
consequences incurred by rural Indian communities.

Thematically, the agricultural cycle of production is being destroyed.
For farmers, it is no longer a right but a privilege to have the ability
to grow a seed, harvest the crop, and sell the yield in a cyclical
process. In the case of Basmati, there is a third party royalty fee to
be paid in order to even access the ability to grow the seed. Historical
knowledge, family recipes and cultivation skills were no match for the
legal apparatus working in favour of RiceTec. Thousands of years of
culture has been threatened within a few years, and so easily, with
minimal recourse. In the case of Bt cotton, the freedom to grow a seed
with bare hands was capped due to scientific genetic patents.

The right to produce has been manipulated by agro-business conglomerates
leaving farmers with a limited capacity to autonomously control the
agricultural production cycle. IPR structures have fuelled the increase
in economic growth and investment levels within India. Conglomerates are
spending some $7 billion a year on research and development[125]. By
2004, Monsanto alone had applied for a total of over 70 patents in India
[126]. Such high levels of investment make it clear that there is no
real solution or conclusion in sight.

Until governing officials both domestically and internationally take a
step back to realize the disastrous effects IPR law has had on rural
communities, change will be hard coming. Amidst great industrial
development potential, rural India is the loser. These losses threaten
sovereignty, income, biodiversity, culture, community and the very
identity of the average Indian[127].

Notes

[1]Bhargava, Pushpa M., (2002), “GMOs: Need for Appropriate Risk
Assessment System”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 37, No. 15, 1402.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Shiva, Vandana, (2000), Stolen Harvest, the Hijacking of the Global
Food Supply, South End Press, Cambridge Mass, 7.
[4] Dasgupta, Biplab, (1999), “Patent Lies and Latent Danger: A Study of
the Political Economy of Patent in India”, Economic and Political Weekly,
Vol. 34, No. 16/17, 980.
[5] Shiva, Vandana, (2001b), Protect or Plunder? Understanding
Intellectual Property Rights, Cox & Wyman, Reading United Kingdom, 104.
[6]United Nations, International Farmer Suicide Crisis, 5.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Shiva 2001b, 104.
[9]Shiva 2001b, 7.
[10] Rai, Saritha, (2001), “India-U.S. Fight on Basmati Rice is Mostly
Settled”, The New York Times.
[11] United Nations, (1997), “The TRIPS agreement and developing
countries” United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, prepared by
UNCTAD Secretariat, New York, 24.
[12] Ramanna, Anitha, (2005), “Bt Cotton and India's Policy on IPRs”,
Asian Biotechnology and Development Review, Special Issue on Biotechnology
and Intellectual Property Rights, Vol. 7 No 2, 44.
[13] Ahluwalia, Montek S, (2002), “Economic Reforms in India Since 1991:
Has Gradualism Worked?”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 16,
No.3, 2.
[14] Moni, Madaswamy, “Impact of economic reforms on Indian Agricultural
Sector: Application of geomatics technology to reduce marginalisation and
vulnerability of small farmers in India”, National Informatics Centre,
Ministry of Information Technology, New Delhi, 1 – 2.
[15] Dasgupta, 981
[16]Shiva, Vandana, (2005), India Divided, Diversity and Democracy Under
Attack, Seven Stories Press, New York, 83.
[17]United Nations, (1997), “The TRIPS agreement and developing
countries”, 24.
[18] Shiva 2000, 89.
[19] Shiva 2001b, 105-5.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22]United Nations, (1997), “The TRIPS agreement and developing
countries”, 30.
[23] Shiva 2001b, 3.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Rao, M.B and Guru, Manjula, (2003), Understanding TRIPS: Managing
Knowledge in Developing Countries, New Delhi, Response Books; Thousand
Oaks CA, Sage Publications, 134.
[27] Jamil, Uzma, (1998), “Biopiracy: The Patenting of Basmati by
RiceTec”, Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social Policy-South
Asia & Sustainable Development Policy Institute.
[28] Shiva 2001b, 56.
[29] Shiva 2000, 85.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Basmati Case Study, Trade Environmental Database, American University
[32] Shiva 2001b, 56.
[33] Shiva 2001b, 49.
[34] Shiva 2001b, 57.
[35] Rao and Guru, 134.
[36] Shiva 2001b, 57.
[37] Rao and Guru, 134.
[38] Shiva 2000, 85.
[39] Canada. International Development Research Centre, Viewpoints.
[40] Jamil, Uzma, (1998), “Biopiracy: The Patenting of Basmati by RiceTec”.
[41] Shiva 2000, 86.
[42]Rai, Saritha, (2001), “India-U.S. Fight on Basmati Rice is Mostly
Settled”, The New York Times.
[43]Ibid.
[44] Rao and Guru, 134.
[45] Ibid.
[46] United Nations, (1997), “The TRIPS agreement and developing
countries”, 9.
[47] Shiva, Vandana, (2001a), “The Basmati Battle And its Implications for
Biopiracy and Trips”, Centre for Research on Globalization.
[48]Rai, Saritha, (2001), “India-U.S. Fight on Basmati Rice is Mostly
Settled”, The New York Times.
[49] Shah, Anup, (2002) “Food Patents – Stealing Indigenous Knowledge?”
Genetically Engineered Food.
[50] Shiva, (2001a).
[51] Ibid.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Shiva 2001b, 62.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Shiva, (2001a).
[58] Shiva 2000, 7.
[59] Rao and Guru, 133.
[60] Shiva 2001b, 47.
[61]Herring, Ronald J., (2007), “Politics of Transgenic Property in India:
Biopiracy, Monopoly Power or Cottage Industry?”, 48th Annual Convention of
the International Studies Association, Feb 28 – Mar 3, Chicago, Illinois, 1.
[62] Rao and Guru, 160.
[63] Ibid.
[64] Utkarsh, Ghate et al., (1999), “Intellectual Property Rights on
Biological Resources: Benefiting from biodiversity and people’s
knowledge”, Current Science, 1420.
[65] Suppan, Steve, “Amending WTO intellectual property rules to prevent
bio-piracy and improve patent quality”, IATP Trade and Global Governance
Program,1-2.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Ramanna, 45-6.
[69] Utkarsh, 1419.
[70] Ramanna, 49.
[71] Stone, Glenn Davis, (2004), “Biotechnology and the Political Ecology
of Information in India”, Human Organization, Vol. 63, No. 2, 131.
[72]Ibid.
[73] Survival Struggle”, (2001), Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 36,
No. 40.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Shiva 2005, 96.
[76] Shiva 2005, 125.
[77] Shiva 2000, 99.
[78] Shiva 2005, 123.
[79] Shiva 2005, 125.
[80] Qaim, Matin et al., “Adoption of Bt Cotton and Impact Variability:
Insights from India”, Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol.28, No.1, 51.
[81] Sai, Y. V. S. T. and David, G. Shourie, (2002), “Bt Cotton: Farmers'
Reactions”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 37, No. 46, 4601.
[82] Qaim, 49.
[83] “Genie out of the Bottle?”, (2001), Economic and Political Weekly,
Vol. 36, No. 45, 4237.
[84] Gala, Rhea, (2005), “India’s Bt Cotton Fraud”, Institute of Science
in Society.
[85] Shiva 2005, 124-5.
[86] Ibid.
[87] Shiva 2005, 125.
[88] “GM in India: the battle over Bt cotton”, (2006), Science and
Development Network.
[89] Rao and Guru, 164.
[90] Qaim, 49.
[91] Pehu, Eija and Ragasa, Catherine, (2007), “Agricultural Biotechnology
Transgenics in Agriculture and their Implications for Developing
Countries”, Background Paper for the World Development Report 2008, 7.
[92] Bhargava, 1402.
[93] Sai, 4602.
[94] “Survival Struggle”, Economic and Political Weekly.
[95] Ibid.
[96] “GM in India: the battle over Bt cotton”, (2006), Science and
Development Network.
[97] Shiva, V, and Jafri, A, (2003), “Failure of GMOs in India”, Research
Foundation for Science, Technology and Ecology.
[98] Long, Jessica, (2007), “WTO Kills Farmers: India Free Market Reforms
Trigger Farmers’ Suicides”, Centre for Research on Globalization.
[99] Ibid.
[100] Pehu and Ragasa, 8-9.
[101] Shiva and Jafri, “Failure of GMOs in India”, Research Foundation for
Science, Technology and Ecology.
[102] Ibid.
[103] Gruère, Guillaume P. et al., (2008), “Bt Cotton and Farmer Suicides
in India, Reviewing the Evidence”, International Food Policy Research
Institute, 36.
[104]United Nations, International Farmer Suicide Crisis, 4.
[105] Sahai, Suman, (2002), “Bt Cotton: Confusion Prevails”, Economic and
Political Weekly, Vol. 37, No. 21.
[106] Pehu and Ragasa, 9.
[107] Sahai, “Bt Cotton: Confusion Prevails”.
[108] Ibid.
[109] Pehu and Ragasa, 4.
[110] Long, “WTO Kills Farmers: India Free Market Reforms Trigger Farmers’
Suicides”.
[111] Stone, 129.
[112] Shiva 2000, 101.
[113] United Nations, International Farmer Suicide Crisis, 11.
[114] Sahai, “Bt Cotton: Confusion Prevails”.
[115] Moni, 2.
[116] United Nations, International Farmer Suicide Crisis, 15
[117] Ibid.
[118]United Nations, International Farmer Suicide Crisis, 18.
[119] Shiva 2000, 3.
[120] Ibid.
[121] Moni, 2.
[122] Sharma, Devinder, (2007), “Displacing farmers: India Will Have 400
million Agricultural Refugees”, Centre for Global Research on
Globalization.
[123] Ibid.
[124] United Nations, International Farmer Suicide Crisis, 2.
[125] Shiva 2001b, 4-5.
[126] Ramanna, 45.

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Appendix

Farmer suicides and Bt cotton area in Andhra Pradesh, 1997-2006

Figure 1.0 Gruère, Guillaume P. et al., (2008), "Bt Cotton and Farmer
Suicides in India, Reviewing the Evidence", International Food Policy
Research Institute. <http://www.ifpri.org/pubs/dp/ifpridp00808.pdf> pg 34.

Figure 1.1 The following is a simplified list of Monsanto’s Patent
Applications
Seeds of Destruction

The Hidden Agenda of Genetic Manipulation

by F. William Engdahl

Global Research, 2007 ISBN 978-0-937147-2-2

This skillfully researched book focuses on how a small socio-political
American elite seeks to establish control over the very basis of human
survival: the provision of our daily bread. "Control the food and you
control the people."

This is no ordinary book about the perils of GMO. Engdahl takes the
reader inside the corridors of power, into the backrooms of the science
labs, behind closed doors in the corporate boardrooms.

The author cogently reveals a diabolical World of profit-driven
political intrigue, government corruption and coercion, where genetic
manipulation and the patenting of life forms are used to gain worldwide
control over food production. If the book often reads as a crime story,
that should come as no surprise. For that is what it is.

Engdahl's carefully argued critique goes far beyond the familiar
controversies surrounding the practice of genetic modification as a
scientific technique. The book is an eye-opener, a must-read for all
those committed to the causes of social justice and World peace.

What is so frightening about Engdahl's vision of the world is that it is
so real. Although our civilization has been built on humanistic ideals,
in this new age of "free markets", everything-- science, commerce,
agriculture and even seeds-- have become weapons in the hands of a few
global corporation barons and their political fellow travelers. To
achieve world domination, they no longer rely on bayonet-wielding
soldiers. All they need is to control food production. (Dr. Arpad
Pusztai, biochemist, formerly of the Rowett Research Institute
Institute, Scotland)

If you want to learn about the socio-political agenda --why biotech
corporations insist on spreading GMO seeds around the World-- you should
read this carefully researched book. You will learn how these
corporations want to achieve control over all mankind, and why we must
resist... (Marijan Jost, Professor of Genetics, Krizevci, Croatia)

The book reads like a murder mystery of an incredible dimension, in
which four giant Anglo-American agribusiness conglomerates have no
hesitation to use GMO to gain control over our very means of
subsistence... (Anton Moser, Professor of Biotechnology, Graz, Austria).