My point is that AV does not provide 'as much security as possible', AV software uses evil (an abundance of additional trusted code) to fight evil (an OS with an abundance of trusted code). Its a medicine that temporarily eases the symptoms, but in fact has a relatively high toxicity level. Its better to try to fix the original problem. I think with the Rogue apps on android, AV has managed to get a foothold due to the laxness of Google. Google could have simply taken the Bitfrost (OLPC) approach by making use of the concept of mutually exclusive permissions. Or Google could have integrated the functionality of the excellent little App 'App permission watcher' (that happens to run without any special privileges) .
Instead of protecting the system "FROM" running potential malware the way that AV tries (and fails) to do , modern security should be focused on protecting the system WHILE running potential malware. To do this, the system must be designed according to the principle of least authority, a principle that when carried to its logical consequence should exclude the notion of granting any process sufficient privileges to even remotely enable it to distinguish malware from benign software. In other words, opening up a least authority system to AV vendors does not only not make the system more secure, it opens a wide hole for malware creators to crawl trough.
Android kinda proofs my point. Just have a look in the play store at the available AV software and what privileges it requires. If you want to educate users, than an even slightly educated android user should not dare to risk installing any software that requires the set of privileges that this AV software requires. In fact, AV software is probably the only type of software that needs these privileges while not being malware itself. So rather than opening up to AV software, if Google would have taken the Bitrost mutually exclusive permissions approach, than conversely there would have been neither a need nor a possibility to install AV software.