Automatically and optimistically upgrade all main-frame navigations to HTTPS, with fast fallback to HTTP.
Does this intent deprecate or change behavior of existing APIs, such that it has potentially high risk for Android WebView-based applications?
Chrome will upgrade these navigations to HTTPS using a 307 internal redirect, which will be visible in the Network panel of Developer Tools.
Currently not available on Android WebView. We are implementing this first for Chrome and will consider bringing this to WebView (likely as an embedder opt-in) as follow up work.
Shipping on desktop | 115 |
Shipping on Android | 115 |
Open questions about a feature may be a source of future web compat or interop issues. Please list open issues (e.g. links to known github issues in the project for the feature specification) whose resolution may introduce web compat/interop risk (e.g., changing to naming or structure of the API in a non-backward-compatible way).
https://github.com/whatwg/fetch/pull/1655--
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Contact emails
cth...@chromium.org, dad...@google.comExplainer
https://github.com/dadrian/https-upgrade/blob/main/explainer.mdSpecification
https://github.com/whatwg/fetch/pull/1655
Summary
Automatically and optimistically upgrade all main-frame navigations to HTTPS, with fast fallback to HTTP.
Blink component
Internals>Network>SSLTAG review
Fetch change process does not mention a TAG review, therefore this is N/A (https://github.com/whatwg/fetch#pull-requests)
TAG review status
Not applicableRisks
Interoperability and Compatibility
Gecko: Positive (https://github.com/mozilla/standards-positions/issues/800) Firefox is offering a similar feature already in their private browsing mode by default
WebKit: No signal (https://github.com/WebKit/standards-positions/issues/185)
Web developers: No signals. This feature is not exposed directly to web developers or users. However, HTTPS adoption is now standard practice (>90% of page loads in Chrome use HTTPS), and automatically upgrading navigations to HTTPS would avoid unnecessary redirects from HTTP to HTTPS for site owners. The `upgrade-insecure-requests` header has some similar functionality, and according to HTTP-Archive is found on ~6% of all requests.
Other signals:WebView application risks
Does this intent deprecate or change behavior of existing APIs, such that it has potentially high risk for Android WebView-based applications?
Debuggability
Chrome will upgrade these navigations to HTTPS using a 307 internal redirect, which will be visible in the Network panel of Developer Tools.
Will this feature be supported on all six Blink platforms (Windows, Mac, Linux, Chrome OS, Android, and Android WebView)?
NoCurrently not available on Android WebView. We are implementing this first for Chrome and will consider bringing this to WebView (likely as an embedder opt-in) as follow up work.
Is this feature fully tested by web-platform-tests?
NoFlag name
https-upgradesRequires code in //chrome?
True
Tracking bug
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1394910Launch bug
https://launch.corp.google.com/launch/4235192Sample links
http://example.com will upgrade to https://example.com.
http://www.alwayshttp.com will upgrade to https://www.alwayshttp.com but fall back to http://www.alwayshttp.com because the site doesn't support HTTPS.Estimated milestones
Shipping on desktop 115
Shipping on Android 115 We are planning to do a field trial to gradually roll out this feature to Chrome clients in Chrome 115.
We're planning to roll this out as a field trial, hopefully starting in Chrome 115 at 1% Stable in order to keep an eye impact. We've been testing our implementation in Chrome Canary/Dev/Beta channels for a while now to help test the feature and polish our implementation, which largely builds on Chrome's existing "HTTPS-First Mode" (which is enabled for users who toggle the "Always use secure connections" opt-in in Chrome's settings).
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAGN7qDAP_u0PRqva-_SPqeJcR8BLRV4EdpspROA7FAEvVKv-fA%40mail.gmail.com.
I am enthusiastic about this (and not just because it should allow us to deprecate/remove `Upgrade-Insecure-Requests`). A few comments inline:On Thu, May 25, 2023 at 1:13 AM Chris Thompson <cth...@chromium.org> wrote:Contact emails
cth...@chromium.org, dad...@google.comExplainer
https://github.com/dadrian/https-upgrade/blob/main/explainer.mdSpecification
https://github.com/whatwg/fetch/pull/1655Thanks for putting this together! I'll leave some comments on the PR. Given that we haven't gotten any feedback from Fetch editors, it might be prudent to let them take a pass before locking in our current behavior.
Do we have tests in place for this behavior in Web Platform Tests? https://wpt.fyi/results/mixed-content/tentative/autoupgrades?label=experimental&label=master&aligned holds some tests for subresources, but I didn't see any around navigation or fallback behavior (which seems like it might need some WPT infrastructure change to produce a domain that's only served over HTTP).
Summary
Automatically and optimistically upgrade all main-frame navigations to HTTPS, with fast fallback to HTTP.
Blink component
Internals>Network>SSLTAG review
Fetch change process does not mention a TAG review, therefore this is N/A (https://github.com/whatwg/fetch#pull-requests)Blink's process does mention a TAG review. I think it would be a good idea to put this in front of them. I also think they will appreciate it, since it's directly in line with their previous guidance (e.g. https://www.w3.org/2001/tag/doc/web-https).
TAG review status
Not applicableRisks
Interoperability and Compatibility
Gecko: Positive (https://github.com/mozilla/standards-positions/issues/800) Firefox is offering a similar feature already in their private browsing mode by default
WebKit: No signal (https://github.com/WebKit/standards-positions/issues/185)
Web developers: No signals. This feature is not exposed directly to web developers or users. However, HTTPS adoption is now standard practice (>90% of page loads in Chrome use HTTPS), and automatically upgrading navigations to HTTPS would avoid unnecessary redirects from HTTP to HTTPS for site owners. The `upgrade-insecure-requests` header has some similar functionality, and according to HTTP-Archive is found on ~6% of all requests.
Other signals:WebView application risks
Does this intent deprecate or change behavior of existing APIs, such that it has potentially high risk for Android WebView-based applications?
Debuggability
Chrome will upgrade these navigations to HTTPS using a 307 internal redirect, which will be visible in the Network panel of Developer Tools.
For HSTS, we synthesize a `Non-Authoritative-Reason` header on the synthetic redirect that tells developers why the redirect happened. Is that a pattern y'all will follow here as well? If so, it's probably a good idea to document it somewhere; I don't think we've explained that header well. :)
Will this feature be supported on all six Blink platforms (Windows, Mac, Linux, Chrome OS, Android, and Android WebView)?
NoCurrently not available on Android WebView. We are implementing this first for Chrome and will consider bringing this to WebView (likely as an embedder opt-in) as follow up work.
Is this feature fully tested by web-platform-tests?
NoFlag name
https-upgradesRequires code in //chrome?
TrueCan you spell out what's required here? Just enterprise policy work, or are there other things embedders would need to implement to make this functionality work?
Tracking bug
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1394910Launch bug
https://launch.corp.google.com/launch/4235192Sample links
http://example.com will upgrade to https://example.com.
http://www.alwayshttp.com will upgrade to https://www.alwayshttp.com but fall back to http://www.alwayshttp.com because the site doesn't support HTTPS.Estimated milestones
Shipping on desktop 115
Shipping on Android 115 We are planning to do a field trial to gradually roll out this feature to Chrome clients in Chrome 115.Over what time period do you expect to ramp up to 100%? If you expect it to push beyond the M115 timeframe, it might be reasonable to frame this as an intent to experiment to give folks a little more time to weigh in on the Fetch PR.
On Wed, May 24, 2023 at 4:43 PM Chris Thompson <cth...@chromium.org> wrote:We're planning to roll this out as a field trial, hopefully starting in Chrome 115 at 1% Stable in order to keep an eye impact. We've been testing our implementation in Chrome Canary/Dev/Beta channels for a while now to help test the feature and polish our implementation, which largely builds on Chrome's existing "HTTPS-First Mode" (which is enabled for users who toggle the "Always use secure connections" opt-in in Chrome's settings).Thanks!How are you going to measure the impact? Do you keep an eye on bad redirects, hangs, people complaining?Also, will you send out a followup when you go to 100% (or revert)? We'd like to turn this on in our chromium based browser as well.
On Thu, May 25, 2023 at 3:36 AM Mike West <mk...@chromium.org> wrote:I am enthusiastic about this (and not just because it should allow us to deprecate/remove `Upgrade-Insecure-Requests`). A few comments inline:On Thu, May 25, 2023 at 1:13 AM Chris Thompson <cth...@chromium.org> wrote:Contact emails
cth...@chromium.org, dad...@google.comExplainer
https://github.com/dadrian/https-upgrade/blob/main/explainer.mdSpecification
https://github.com/whatwg/fetch/pull/1655Thanks for putting this together! I'll leave some comments on the PR. Given that we haven't gotten any feedback from Fetch editors, it might be prudent to let them take a pass before locking in our current behavior.Yes, hopefully we can get some feedback, but I'm optimistic that we won't be locking in behavior if we ship this as it should hopefully be not site or user visible, so if we need to change the behavior to align cross-browser we can iterate.
Do we have tests in place for this behavior in Web Platform Tests? https://wpt.fyi/results/mixed-content/tentative/autoupgrades?label=experimental&label=master&aligned holds some tests for subresources, but I didn't see any around navigation or fallback behavior (which seems like it might need some WPT infrastructure change to produce a domain that's only served over HTTP).We do not have Web Platform Tests but we can look into adding them. Currently this is implemented in //chrome which I think might make this more difficult (my understanding is that the WPT suite is run against content_shell rather than chrome). We are currently relying on browser tests for our integration testing.
Summary
Automatically and optimistically upgrade all main-frame navigations to HTTPS, with fast fallback to HTTP.
Blink component
Internals>Network>SSLTAG review
Fetch change process does not mention a TAG review, therefore this is N/A (https://github.com/whatwg/fetch#pull-requests)Blink's process does mention a TAG review. I think it would be a good idea to put this in front of them. I also think they will appreciate it, since it's directly in line with their previous guidance (e.g. https://www.w3.org/2001/tag/doc/web-https).Sure, we can file a TAG review. I'll update this thread once that's done.TAG review status
Not applicableRisks
Interoperability and Compatibility
Gecko: Positive (https://github.com/mozilla/standards-positions/issues/800) Firefox is offering a similar feature already in their private browsing mode by default
WebKit: No signal (https://github.com/WebKit/standards-positions/issues/185)
Web developers: No signals. This feature is not exposed directly to web developers or users. However, HTTPS adoption is now standard practice (>90% of page loads in Chrome use HTTPS), and automatically upgrading navigations to HTTPS would avoid unnecessary redirects from HTTP to HTTPS for site owners. The `upgrade-insecure-requests` header has some similar functionality, and according to HTTP-Archive is found on ~6% of all requests.
Other signals:WebView application risks
Does this intent deprecate or change behavior of existing APIs, such that it has potentially high risk for Android WebView-based applications?
Debuggability
Chrome will upgrade these navigations to HTTPS using a 307 internal redirect, which will be visible in the Network panel of Developer Tools.
For HSTS, we synthesize a `Non-Authoritative-Reason` header on the synthetic redirect that tells developers why the redirect happened. Is that a pattern y'all will follow here as well? If so, it's probably a good idea to document it somewhere; I don't think we've explained that header well. :)Good idea. I'll get a CL up to add this to our implementation, and it seems reasonable to merge back to M115. We can include a mention of it in any public facing documentation we write about this. I'm also looking into whether we can add NetLog events for the upgrade and fallback steps which could help with triaging bug reports.
Will this feature be supported on all six Blink platforms (Windows, Mac, Linux, Chrome OS, Android, and Android WebView)?
NoCurrently not available on Android WebView. We are implementing this first for Chrome and will consider bringing this to WebView (likely as an embedder opt-in) as follow up work.
Is this feature fully tested by web-platform-tests?
NoFlag name
https-upgradesRequires code in //chrome?
TrueCan you spell out what's required here? Just enterprise policy work, or are there other things embedders would need to implement to make this functionality work?This feature is currently implemented in //chrome with some support code in content/'s NavigationRequest. I think it would be feasible to migrate the core of this into content/ -- we use an URLRequestLoaderInterceptor and a NavigationThrottle to implement the upgrading and fallback logic. This is currently shared with Chrome's HTTPS-First Mode (controlled by Chrome's "Always use secure connections" setting). If we did migrate this logic to content/, embedders would need to add their own support for at least (1) how to handle allowlisting hostnames, and (2) enterprise policies for enabling/disabling the feature and exempting hostnames. We do not have a design ready for making this change though.
Tracking bug
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1394910Launch bug
https://launch.corp.google.com/launch/4235192Sample links
http://example.com will upgrade to https://example.com.
http://www.alwayshttp.com will upgrade to https://www.alwayshttp.com but fall back to http://www.alwayshttp.com because the site doesn't support HTTPS.Estimated milestones
Shipping on desktop 115
Shipping on Android 115 We are planning to do a field trial to gradually roll out this feature to Chrome clients in Chrome 115.Over what time period do you expect to ramp up to 100%? If you expect it to push beyond the M115 timeframe, it might be reasonable to frame this as an intent to experiment to give folks a little more time to weigh in on the Fetch PR.We are hoping to ramp up to 100% within M115, but it may end up completing in M116.(We could do an I2E, but it did not seem like a good fit as there is no Origin Trial component, this does not require developer involvement, etc. Our understanding was even doing a non-OT 1% Stable rollout required sending an I2S and getting LGTMs from API OWNERS. Let us know if you think we should reassess our launch plan.)
On Fri, May 26, 2023 at 1:32 AM Chris Thompson <cth...@chromium.org> wrote:On Thu, May 25, 2023 at 3:36 AM Mike West <mk...@chromium.org> wrote:I am enthusiastic about this (and not just because it should allow us to deprecate/remove `Upgrade-Insecure-Requests`). A few comments inline:On Thu, May 25, 2023 at 1:13 AM Chris Thompson <cth...@chromium.org> wrote:Contact emails
cth...@chromium.org, dad...@google.comExplainer
https://github.com/dadrian/https-upgrade/blob/main/explainer.mdSpecification
https://github.com/whatwg/fetch/pull/1655Thanks for putting this together! I'll leave some comments on the PR. Given that we haven't gotten any feedback from Fetch editors, it might be prudent to let them take a pass before locking in our current behavior.Yes, hopefully we can get some feedback, but I'm optimistic that we won't be locking in behavior if we ship this as it should hopefully be not site or user visible, so if we need to change the behavior to align cross-browser we can iterate.I left a few comments last week. I think the PR needs some work before we can reasonably expect it to land in Fetch.Do we have tests in place for this behavior in Web Platform Tests? https://wpt.fyi/results/mixed-content/tentative/autoupgrades?label=experimental&label=master&aligned holds some tests for subresources, but I didn't see any around navigation or fallback behavior (which seems like it might need some WPT infrastructure change to produce a domain that's only served over HTTP).We do not have Web Platform Tests but we can look into adding them. Currently this is implemented in //chrome which I think might make this more difficult (my understanding is that the WPT suite is run against content_shell rather than chrome). We are currently relying on browser tests for our integration testing.WPT is a pretty important part of shipping features that affect the platform. It would be ideal if we could share these tests with our friends at other vendors (and update existing tests that might be expecting different behavior). Shifting the implementation to //content to make that possible would also have the advantage of helping other Chromium embedders ship this feature, which would be excellent for consistency in the project.
--
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As a long-time user of HTTPS-first mode, I'm excited to see this ship ASAP!On Wed, May 31, 2023, 5:29 a.m. 'Mike West' via blink-dev <blin...@chromium.org> wrote:On Fri, May 26, 2023 at 1:32 AM Chris Thompson <cth...@chromium.org> wrote:On Thu, May 25, 2023 at 3:36 AM Mike West <mk...@chromium.org> wrote:I am enthusiastic about this (and not just because it should allow us to deprecate/remove `Upgrade-Insecure-Requests`). A few comments inline:On Thu, May 25, 2023 at 1:13 AM Chris Thompson <cth...@chromium.org> wrote:Contact emails
cth...@chromium.org, dad...@google.comExplainer
https://github.com/dadrian/https-upgrade/blob/main/explainer.mdSpecification
https://github.com/whatwg/fetch/pull/1655Thanks for putting this together! I'll leave some comments on the PR. Given that we haven't gotten any feedback from Fetch editors, it might be prudent to let them take a pass before locking in our current behavior.Yes, hopefully we can get some feedback, but I'm optimistic that we won't be locking in behavior if we ship this as it should hopefully be not site or user visible, so if we need to change the behavior to align cross-browser we can iterate.I left a few comments last week. I think the PR needs some work before we can reasonably expect it to land in Fetch.Do we have tests in place for this behavior in Web Platform Tests? https://wpt.fyi/results/mixed-content/tentative/autoupgrades?label=experimental&label=master&aligned holds some tests for subresources, but I didn't see any around navigation or fallback behavior (which seems like it might need some WPT infrastructure change to produce a domain that's only served over HTTP).We do not have Web Platform Tests but we can look into adding them. Currently this is implemented in //chrome which I think might make this more difficult (my understanding is that the WPT suite is run against content_shell rather than chrome). We are currently relying on browser tests for our integration testing.WPT is a pretty important part of shipping features that affect the platform. It would be ideal if we could share these tests with our friends at other vendors (and update existing tests that might be expecting different behavior). Shifting the implementation to //content to make that possible would also have the advantage of helping other Chromium embedders ship this feature, which would be excellent for consistency in the project.Note that the official WPT results on wpt.fyi are using full Chrome builds. IIRC there are other features that require Chrome. I personally only consider having WPTs passing on upstream infra to be blocking I2S. @Panos Astithas can say more authoritatively.+1 to the benefits of having this in content, but I personally think that's outside the scope of API owners so not something that should block an I2S.
-mikeOn Wed, May 31, 2023 at 4:17 PM Rick Byers <rby...@chromium.org> wrote:As a long-time user of HTTPS-first mode, I'm excited to see this ship ASAP!On Wed, May 31, 2023, 5:29 a.m. 'Mike West' via blink-dev <blin...@chromium.org> wrote:On Fri, May 26, 2023 at 1:32 AM Chris Thompson <cth...@chromium.org> wrote:On Thu, May 25, 2023 at 3:36 AM Mike West <mk...@chromium.org> wrote:I am enthusiastic about this (and not just because it should allow us to deprecate/remove `Upgrade-Insecure-Requests`). A few comments inline:On Thu, May 25, 2023 at 1:13 AM Chris Thompson <cth...@chromium.org> wrote:Contact emails
cth...@chromium.org, dad...@google.comExplainer
https://github.com/dadrian/https-upgrade/blob/main/explainer.mdSpecification
https://github.com/whatwg/fetch/pull/1655Thanks for putting this together! I'll leave some comments on the PR. Given that we haven't gotten any feedback from Fetch editors, it might be prudent to let them take a pass before locking in our current behavior.Yes, hopefully we can get some feedback, but I'm optimistic that we won't be locking in behavior if we ship this as it should hopefully be not site or user visible, so if we need to change the behavior to align cross-browser we can iterate.I left a few comments last week. I think the PR needs some work before we can reasonably expect it to land in Fetch.Do we have tests in place for this behavior in Web Platform Tests? https://wpt.fyi/results/mixed-content/tentative/autoupgrades?label=experimental&label=master&aligned holds some tests for subresources, but I didn't see any around navigation or fallback behavior (which seems like it might need some WPT infrastructure change to produce a domain that's only served over HTTP).We do not have Web Platform Tests but we can look into adding them. Currently this is implemented in //chrome which I think might make this more difficult (my understanding is that the WPT suite is run against content_shell rather than chrome). We are currently relying on browser tests for our integration testing.WPT is a pretty important part of shipping features that affect the platform. It would be ideal if we could share these tests with our friends at other vendors (and update existing tests that might be expecting different behavior). Shifting the implementation to //content to make that possible would also have the advantage of helping other Chromium embedders ship this feature, which would be excellent for consistency in the project.Note that the official WPT results on wpt.fyi are using full Chrome builds. IIRC there are other features that require Chrome. I personally only consider having WPTs passing on upstream infra to be blocking I2S. @Panos Astithas can say more authoritatively.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAJ8Nf20mYRwXxCjadR5MuQ5DPj7nHa6MGEkFe5576W1tZ8MkPQ%40mail.gmail.com.
Thanks all. Some updates:
- We have filed a TAG review request
- We are working on writing WPTs and we will update this thread when those are ready -- thanks for the added details about how those are run
- We have added a `Non-Authoritative-Reason: HttpsUpgrades` header to the synthetic redirects (CL, which we are planning to merge back to M-115)
- We are continuing to iterate on the spec PR
For now we will continue to provide updates on this I2S -- closer to M115 going to Stable we may send an I2E to request the ability to proceed with a 1% Stable experiment if we have not yet been able to resolve everything here.@Harald Alvestrand : In general, this feature should work fine with captive portals. A captive portal that intercepts HTTPS connections will result in a certificate error, which will cause the upgrade to fail and automatically fall back to HTTP. Alternatively, the captive portal could reset the connection for HTTPS requests, which would accomplish the same.We have had one report of a middlebox that returned an HTTP 404 error over HTTPS instead of rejecting the connection, causing breakage (the upgraded HTTPS page would load but have useless content). We do not believe the browser should fallback on application level errors, as they do not provide a useful signal that the site does not support HTTPS -- in the vast majority of cases the same application error will occur over HTTP as well. (This specific case was an enterprise situation, with an enterprise installed root certificate making the middlebox's HTTPS work, and we have enterprise policies to allow organizations to disable upgrades for affected hosts.)
On Wed, Jun 7, 2023 at 1:02 AM Harald Alvestrand <h...@google.com> wrote:How will this affect login to captive portals (WiFi login), which frequently rely on rewriting HTTP requests?On Tue, Jun 6, 2023 at 12:00 AM 'Panos Astithas' via blink-dev <blin...@chromium.org> wrote:On Wed, May 31, 2023 at 7:31 AM Mike West <mk...@google.com> wrote:-mikeOn Wed, May 31, 2023 at 4:17 PM Rick Byers <rby...@chromium.org> wrote:As a long-time user of HTTPS-first mode, I'm excited to see this ship ASAP!On Wed, May 31, 2023, 5:29 a.m. 'Mike West' via blink-dev <blin...@chromium.org> wrote:On Fri, May 26, 2023 at 1:32 AM Chris Thompson <cth...@chromium.org> wrote:On Thu, May 25, 2023 at 3:36 AM Mike West <mk...@chromium.org> wrote:I am enthusiastic about this (and not just because it should allow us to deprecate/remove `Upgrade-Insecure-Requests`). A few comments inline:On Thu, May 25, 2023 at 1:13 AM Chris Thompson <cth...@chromium.org> wrote:Contact emails
cth...@chromium.org, dad...@google.comExplainer
https://github.com/dadrian/https-upgrade/blob/main/explainer.mdSpecification
https://github.com/whatwg/fetch/pull/1655Thanks for putting this together! I'll leave some comments on the PR. Given that we haven't gotten any feedback from Fetch editors, it might be prudent to let them take a pass before locking in our current behavior.Yes, hopefully we can get some feedback, but I'm optimistic that we won't be locking in behavior if we ship this as it should hopefully be not site or user visible, so if we need to change the behavior to align cross-browser we can iterate.I left a few comments last week. I think the PR needs some work before we can reasonably expect it to land in Fetch.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CALMy46Q--Fj9qV%3D28_CY9au4h-Gc%3D3dYWPFNeT1g-wdmQxEvSQ%40mail.gmail.com.
Thanks for working on this!On Wed, Jun 7, 2023 at 11:44 PM Chris Thompson <cth...@chromium.org> wrote:Thanks all. Some updates:
- We have filed a TAG review request
- We are working on writing WPTs and we will update this thread when those are ready -- thanks for the added details about how those are run
- We have added a `Non-Authoritative-Reason: HttpsUpgrades` header to the synthetic redirects (CL, which we are planning to merge back to M-115)
- We are continuing to iterate on the spec PR
For now we will continue to provide updates on this I2S -- closer to M115 going to Stable we may send an I2E to request the ability to proceed with a 1% Stable experiment if we have not yet been able to resolve everything here.@Harald Alvestrand : In general, this feature should work fine with captive portals. A captive portal that intercepts HTTPS connections will result in a certificate error, which will cause the upgrade to fail and automatically fall back to HTTP. Alternatively, the captive portal could reset the connection for HTTPS requests, which would accomplish the same.We have had one report of a middlebox that returned an HTTP 404 error over HTTPS instead of rejecting the connection, causing breakage (the upgraded HTTPS page would load but have useless content). We do not believe the browser should fallback on application level errors, as they do not provide a useful signal that the site does not support HTTPS -- in the vast majority of cases the same application error will occur over HTTP as well. (This specific case was an enterprise situation, with an enterprise installed root certificate making the middlebox's HTTPS work, and we have enterprise policies to allow organizations to disable upgrades for affected hosts.)What's our plan to tackle such issues? Do we have an enterprise policy in place?
On Wed, Jun 7, 2023 at 9:41 PM Yoav Weiss <yoav...@chromium.org> wrote:Thanks for working on this!On Wed, Jun 7, 2023 at 11:44 PM Chris Thompson <cth...@chromium.org> wrote:Thanks all. Some updates:
- We have filed a TAG review request
- We are working on writing WPTs and we will update this thread when those are ready -- thanks for the added details about how those are run
- We have added a `Non-Authoritative-Reason: HttpsUpgrades` header to the synthetic redirects (CL, which we are planning to merge back to M-115)
- We are continuing to iterate on the spec PR
For now we will continue to provide updates on this I2S -- closer to M115 going to Stable we may send an I2E to request the ability to proceed with a 1% Stable experiment if we have not yet been able to resolve everything here.@Harald Alvestrand : In general, this feature should work fine with captive portals. A captive portal that intercepts HTTPS connections will result in a certificate error, which will cause the upgrade to fail and automatically fall back to HTTP. Alternatively, the captive portal could reset the connection for HTTPS requests, which would accomplish the same.We have had one report of a middlebox that returned an HTTP 404 error over HTTPS instead of rejecting the connection, causing breakage (the upgraded HTTPS page would load but have useless content). We do not believe the browser should fallback on application level errors, as they do not provide a useful signal that the site does not support HTTPS -- in the vast majority of cases the same application error will occur over HTTP as well. (This specific case was an enterprise situation, with an enterprise installed root certificate making the middlebox's HTTPS work, and we have enterprise policies to allow organizations to disable upgrades for affected hosts.)What's our plan to tackle such issues? Do we have an enterprise policy in place?We have two enterprise policies for this feature:
- HttpsUpgradesEnabled can be used to disable this feature on managed clients (we have a similar policy for Chrome's HTTPS-First Mode, i.e. the opt-in "Always use secure connections" setting)
- HttpAllowlist can be used to allowlist hostnames or hostname patterns -- these will then not be upgraded on managed clients (this also applies to HTTPS-First Mode)
There are two "escape hatches" for users who encounter breakage and need to fall back to HTTP, although from prior measurement we expect this to be rare:
- If the user explicitly types an "http://" URL into the Omnibox (with the scheme), we skip upgrading that navigation and add the host to the allowlist.
- If the user sets the "Insecure Content" content setting (chrome://settings/content/insecureContent) to "Allowed" for the site, then we skip upgrading navigations. (This setting also disables mixed content autoupgrading -- for HTTPS Upgrades and HTTPS-First Mode we rely on Mixed Content Level 2 to ensure no plaintext subresource requests are sent.)
On Wed, Jun 7, 2023 at 1:02 AM Harald Alvestrand <h...@google.com> wrote:
How will this affect login to captive portals (WiFi login), which frequently rely on rewriting HTTP requests?
On Tue, Jun 6, 2023 at 12:00 AM 'Panos Astithas' via blink-dev <blin...@chromium.org> wrote:
On Wed, May 31, 2023 at 7:31 AM Mike West <mk...@google.com> wrote:
-mike
On Wed, May 31, 2023 at 4:17 PM Rick Byers <rby...@chromium.org> wrote:
As a long-time user of HTTPS-first mode, I'm excited to see this ship ASAP!
On Wed, May 31, 2023, 5:29 a.m. 'Mike West' via blink-dev <blin...@chromium.org> wrote:
On Fri, May 26, 2023 at 1:32 AM Chris Thompson <cth...@chromium.org> wrote:
On Thu, May 25, 2023 at 3:36 AM Mike West <mk...@chromium.org> wrote:
I am enthusiastic about this (and not just because it should allow us to deprecate/remove `Upgrade-Insecure-Requests`). A few comments inline:
On Thu, May 25, 2023 at 1:13 AM Chris Thompson <cth...@chromium.org> wrote:
Contact emailscth...@chromium.org, dadrian@google.com
Explainerhttps://github.com/dadrian/https-upgrade/blob/main/explainer.md
Specificationhttps://github.com/whatwg/fetch/pull/1655
Thanks for putting this together! I'll leave some comments on the PR. Given that we haven't gotten any feedback from Fetch editors, it might be prudent to let them take a pass before locking in our current behavior.
Yes, hopefully we can get some feedback, but I'm optimistic that we won't be locking in behavior if we ship this as it should hopefully be not site or user visible, so if we need to change the behavior to align cross-browser we can iterate.
I left a few comments last week. I think the PR needs some work before we can reasonably expect it to land in Fetch.
I agree (and left a few comments of my own). Would it be possible to make some progress on this? Once the comments are addressed and we feel good about the PR's state, could we use the Mozilla position as support and publish the PR for review? (It's currently marked as a draft, which may explain why it wasn't reviewed by Fetch editors)
Do we have tests in place for this behavior in Web Platform Tests? https://wpt.fyi/results/mixed-content/tentative/autoupgrades?label=experimental&label=master&aligned holds some tests for subresources, but I didn't see any around navigation or fallback behavior (which seems like it might need some WPT infrastructure change to produce a domain that's only served over HTTP).We do not have Web Platform Tests but we can look into adding them. Currently this is implemented in //chrome which I think might make this more difficult (my understanding is that the WPT suite is run against content_shell rather than chrome). We are currently relying on browser tests for our integration testing.WPT is a pretty important part of shipping features that affect the platform. It would be ideal if we could share these tests with our friends at other vendors (and update existing tests that might be expecting different behavior). Shifting the implementation to //content to make that possible would also have the advantage of helping other Chromium embedders ship this feature, which would be excellent for consistency in the project.Note that the official WPT results on wpt.fyi are using full Chrome builds. IIRC there are other features that require Chrome. I personally only consider having WPTs passing on upstream infra to be blocking I2S. @Panos Astithas can say more authoritatively.Indeed, upstream WPT results use full Chrome (and Firefox, Safari, etc.) through wptrunner. Soon, this will also be the case when running WPT in Chromium CI on Linux, once some blockers have been resolved.Panos
+1 to the benefits of having this in content, but I personally think that's outside the scope of API owners so not something that should block an I2S.I agree with this. I didn't mean to imply that //content implementation was necessary, but that _having_ web platform tests is important for interop. Browser tests are less useful in that regard. :)
SummaryAutomatically and optimistically upgrade all main-frame navigations to HTTPS, with fast fallback to HTTP.
Blink componentInternals>Network>SSL
TAG reviewFetch change process does not mention a TAG review, therefore this is N/A (https://github.com/whatwg/fetch#pull-requests)
Blink's process does mention a TAG review. I think it would be a good idea to put this in front of them. I also think they will appreciate it, since it's directly in line with their previous guidance (e.g. https://www.w3.org/2001/tag/doc/web-https).
Sure, we can file a TAG review. I'll update this thread once that's done.
TAG review statusNot applicable
Risks
Interoperability and Compatibility
Gecko: Positive (https://github.com/mozilla/standards-positions/issues/800) Firefox is offering a similar feature already in their private browsing mode by default
WebKit: No signal (https://github.com/WebKit/standards-positions/issues/185)
Web developers: No signals. This feature is not exposed directly to web developers or users. However, HTTPS adoption is now standard practice (>90% of page loads in Chrome use HTTPS), and automatically upgrading navigations to HTTPS would avoid unnecessary redirects from HTTP to HTTPS for site owners. The `upgrade-insecure-requests` header has some similar functionality, and according to HTTP-Archive is found on ~6% of all requests.
Other signals:
WebView application risksDoes this intent deprecate or change behavior of existing APIs, such that it has potentially high risk for Android WebView-based applications?
DebuggabilityChrome will upgrade these navigations to HTTPS using a 307 internal redirect, which will be visible in the Network panel of Developer Tools.
For HSTS, we synthesize a `Non-Authoritative-Reason` header on the synthetic redirect that tells developers why the redirect happened. Is that a pattern y'all will follow here as well? If so, it's probably a good idea to document it somewhere; I don't think we've explained that header well. :)
Good idea. I'll get a CL up to add this to our implementation, and it seems reasonable to merge back to M115. We can include a mention of it in any public facing documentation we write about this. I'm also looking into whether we can add NetLog events for the upgrade and fallback steps which could help with triaging bug reports.
Thanks!Will this feature be supported on all six Blink platforms (Windows, Mac, Linux, Chrome OS, Android, and Android WebView)?NoCurrently not available on Android WebView. We are implementing this first for Chrome and will consider bringing this to WebView (likely as an embedder opt-in) as follow up work.
Is this feature fully tested by web-platform-tests?No
Flag namehttps-upgrades
Requires code in //chrome?TrueCan you spell out what's required here? Just enterprise policy work, or are there other things embedders would need to implement to make this functionality work?This feature is currently implemented in //chrome with some support code in content/'s NavigationRequest. I think it would be feasible to migrate the core of this into content/ -- we use an URLRequestLoaderInterceptor and a NavigationThrottle to implement the upgrading and fallback logic. This is currently shared with Chrome's HTTPS-First Mode (controlled by Chrome's "Always use secure connections" setting). If we did migrate this logic to content/, embedders would need to add their own support for at least (1) how to handle allowlisting hostnames, and (2) enterprise policies for enabling/disabling the feature and exempting hostnames. We do not have a design ready for making this change though.As mentioned above, it would be ideal for the pieces of this change that affect the platform to be available in //content so they flow into content_shell and other embedders.
Sample links
http://example.com will upgrade to https://example.com.
http://www.alwayshttp.com will upgrade to https://www.alwayshttp.com but fall back to http://www.alwayshttp.com because the site doesn't support HTTPS.
Estimated milestonesShipping on desktop115Shipping on Android115We are planning to do a field trial to gradually roll out this feature to Chrome clients in Chrome 115.
Over what time period do you expect to ramp up to 100%? If you expect it to push beyond the M115 timeframe, it might be reasonable to frame this as an intent to experiment to give folks a little more time to weigh in on the Fetch PR.
We are hoping to ramp up to 100% within M115, but it may end up completing in M116.(We could do an I2E, but it did not seem like a good fit as there is no Origin Trial component, this does not require developer involvement, etc. Our understanding was even doing a non-OT 1% Stable rollout required sending an I2S and getting LGTMs from API OWNERS. Let us know if you think we should reassess our launch plan.)
We do have an experimentation path for running a Finch experiment on stable/beta users (confusingly(?) under "Origin Trial" in our documentation; we could probably improve that).I think I'd recommend that path to avoid any delays that might come up in getting Fetch updated to support this feature. I'd LGTM an I2E @ 50% beta/1% stable to gain confidence in the fallback mechanism at scale. For I2S, I'm a little worried about the state of the spec and its eventual interoperability across vendors. I'd like to get that hammered down before making it harder to change details that developers might come to rely upon.-mike
Anticipated spec changesOpen questions about a feature may be a source of future web compat or interop issues. Please list open issues (e.g. links to known github issues in the project for the feature specification) whose resolution may introduce web compat/interop risk (e.g., changing to naming or structure of the API in a non-backward-compatible way).
https://github.com/whatwg/fetch/pull/1655
Link to entry on the Chrome Platform Statushttps://chromestatus.com/feature/6056181032812544
Links to previous Intent discussionsIntent to prototype: https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/blink-dev/c/mgJqym5-Xek/m/0EAN6v7CCQAJ
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Hi,
Is there a way to disable this feature? I tried running the browser with " --disable-features=HttpsUpgrades", but it still seems to be performing these upgrades.
Thanks,
-shez-
I see the following in the netlog:
t= 97 [st= 0] TRANSPORT_SECURITY_STATE_SHOULD_UPGRADE_TO_SSL
--> get_sts_state_result = true <--- this is false in the m115 build
--> host = "dsbeta.prod.bloomberg.com"
--> host_found_in_hsts_bypass_list = false
--> should_upgrade_to_ssl = true
t= 97 [st= 0] +URL_REQUEST_START_JOB [dt=25]
--> initiator = "not an origin"
--> load_flags = 65792 (CAN_USE_RESTRICTED_PREFETCH | MAIN_FRAME_DEPRECATED)
--> method = "GET"
--> network_isolation_key = "http://bloomberg.com http://bloomberg.com"
--> request_type = "main frame"
--> site_for_cookies = "SiteForCookies: {site=http://bloomberg.com; schemefully_same=true}"
--> url = "http://dsbeta.prod.bloomberg.com/vrs2021/viewer/index.html"
t= 97 [st= 0] URL_REQUEST_REDIRECT_JOB
--> reason = "HSTS"
t= 97 [st= 0] URL_REQUEST_FAKE_RESPONSE_HEADERS_CREATED
--> HTTP/1.1 307 Internal Redirect
Location: https://dsbeta.prod.bloomberg.com/vrs2021/viewer/index.html
Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: Cross-Origin
Non-Authoritative-Reason: HSTSOn Mon, Jul 10, 2023 at 8:12 PM Shezan Baig <shezb...@gmail.com> wrote:I am using a locally built chrome.exe (so not one of the Canary/Dev/Beta channels), and doing the following:
116.0.5845.14/chrome.exe --proxy-server=<internal-proxy> http://<internal-url>
This causes the <internal-proxy> to get a "CONNECT <internal-url>:443", which unfortunately the proxy is not currently configured to handle properly (it blocks and times out after a minute). I can fix the <internal-proxy> to handle it correctly, but rolling out that change may take a while.
In the meantime, I'm trying to workaround the issue by doing:
116.0.5845.14/chrome.exe --disable-features=HttpsUpgrades --proxy-server=<internal-proxy> http://<internal-url>
However, that doesn't seem to make any difference (proxy is still getting a "CONNECT <internal-url>:443").
Note that our previous build (115.0.5790.32) does not do these upgrades, so I don't need any disable-feature switch for the m115 build. However, the m116 build does these upgrades with or without the disable-feature switch.
Also note that these are locally built chromium binaries (not "Google Chrome"), so it will not participate in the 50% experiments.
Thanks for your quick response!
-shez-
I've been waiting a bit to see if the experiment would blow anything up, but if it doesn't, and continue to not do so, then
LGTM1 as soon as the PR has landed.
/Daniel
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We have iterated on the Fetch spec PR and believe it is ready to land modulo some editorial tweaks.
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Same (LGTM).
I assume you have also not had any unexpected feedback. The methods you added to force http seemed adequate but you never know when you encounter the wild wild web.
/Daniel
Same situation here @FrankyI'm working for a mobile payment service provider that offers mobile payment in multiple countries in Europe.Multiple mobile network operators in Europe like few ones in Poland currently only support end user identification via header enrichment!The header enrichment is used for an automatic silent end user identification that allows service providers in subsequent flow (of course via https!) to:a) auto-login an already known end user in mobile webb) offer an end-user the possibility to purchase a good/service without need to enter mobile phone number of a user in mobile web (which would require a media break to validate the number via SMS).The enforced https upgrade has a huge negative impact on usability of such services for end-users in mobile web:Flow that worked automatically in the past gets now interrupted by a request for confirmation for an unsecure flow -> scares a lot of people as it looks very unprofessional.Hope you have a realizable idea to deal with this use case, to offer end users a good user experience again!(changing identify flow from HE to redirect loop ot mobile network operator is unfortunately not, as they have very limited ressources :(
We are observing that this change is breaking traffic going through middleboxes when the upstreams have misconfigured TLS. The main problem is that from the moment a middlebox completes the TLS handshake of the HTTPS-upgraded connection, the fallback cannot be triggered. Although the blog post [link] and the explainer [link] suggest using a 404 response or a specific header from the upstream to trigger the fallback, neither of these options seem to be available in Chrome. Consequently, enterprise proxies need to advise admins to disable the automatic upgrades feature for their users to avoid breaking some traffic. This is a bad outcome both in terms of security and configuration complexity. Ideally we’d like all users to keep this feature enabled, but have it work when middleboxes are involved and the upstream is faulty.
Another critical aspect here is that sometimes middleboxes terminate TLS with the eyeball before contacting the upstream. This can happen for security or performance reasons, to improve UX, or to provide other features. Previously this was acceptable as the middlebox could return an HTML error page if the connection failed. With the introduction of this feature, instead users are unable to access the upstream, only seeing an error message from the middlebox.
If Chrome were to support the opt-out header as outlined in the explainer linked above, middleboxes could return it when upstreams turn out to be unreachable. Alternatively, following the recommendation on this comment [link], if Chrome sent a header identifying the current request as being triggered by the automatic upgrade flow, then middleboxes would be able to redirect to HTTP in these situations. Notice this can’t be done in the general case, since the middlebox might be redirecting the user to a site they didn’t request.
We believe implementing these changes would greatly enhance compatibility with middleboxes and improve the overall user experience,so we appreciate your attention to this matter and eagerly await your feedback
We are observing that this change is breaking traffic going through middleboxes when the upstreams have misconfigured TLS. The main problem is that from the moment a middlebox completes the TLS handshake of the HTTPS-upgraded connection, the fallback cannot be triggered. Although the blog post [link] and the explainer [link] suggest using a 404 response or a specific header from the upstream to trigger the fallback, neither of these options seem to be available in Chrome. Consequently, enterprise proxies need to advise admins to disable the automatic upgrades feature for their users to avoid breaking some traffic. This is a bad outcome both in terms of security and configuration complexity. Ideally we’d like all users to keep this feature enabled, but have it work when middleboxes are involved and the upstream is faulty.
Another critical aspect here is that sometimes middleboxes terminate TLS with the eyeball before contacting the upstream. This can happen for security or performance reasons, to improve UX, or to provide other features. Previously this was acceptable as the middlebox could return an HTML error page if the connection failed. With the introduction of this feature, instead users are unable to access the upstream, only seeing an error message from the middlebox.
If Chrome were to support the opt-out header as outlined in the explainer linked above, middleboxes could return it when upstreams turn out to be unreachable. Alternatively, following the recommendation on this comment [link], if Chrome sent a header identifying the current request as being triggered by the automatic upgrade flow, then middleboxes would be able to redirect to HTTP in these situations. Notice this can’t be done in the general case, since the middlebox might be redirecting the user to a site they didn’t request.
We believe implementing these changes would greatly enhance compatibility with middleboxes and improve the overall user experience,so we appreciate your attention to this matter and eagerly await your feedback